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2019 Draft Strategy: Trade Down

June 16, 2019 Jeff Miller Leave a Comment

The 2018 draft was very strong, particularly at the top. Each of the top 5 picks made the All-Rookie First Team. Though voting on All-Rookie teams tends to be biased somewhat by draft position, this result was largely justified. Each of these players was among the 8 rookies with 3+ Win Shares this season. Further, eight of the top 10 and ten of the top 13 rookies by Win Shares were lottery picks. Other advanced stats paint a similar picture. Using VORP (Value Over Replacement Player, based on Box Plus-Minus), lottery picks account for 7 of the top 8, 9 of the top 12, and 10 of the top 14.

But every draft is different. While it may be tempting to view the 2018 draft as evidence that lottery picks are especially valuable or that teams are getting better at prospect evaluation, you don’t have to go back far to see that talent is often much more evenly distributed.

Looking instead at the previous 5 drafts, you might be tempted to conclude that there’s barely any relationship at all between draft position and NBA success. In that time, we’ve seen a few #1 overall picks struggle mightily (Anthony Bennett, Andrew Wiggins, Markelle Fultz), while non-lottery, second round, and even undrafted players have become stars or key contributors on contending teams. The top 2 players to date from those drafts went #15 (Giannis) and #41 (Jokic).

Meanwhile, the Toronto Raptors just won the NBA title without a single lottery pick on the entire roster. Their 8-man rotation consisted of the following players (sorted by Finals playing time, with draft position in parentheses): Kawhi Leonard (2011 #15), Pascal Siakam (2016 #27), Kyle Lowry (2006 #24), Fred VanVleet (2016 undrafted), Marc Gasol (2007 #48), Serge Ibaka (2008 #24), Danny Green (2009 #46), and Norman Powell (2015 #46).

Turning to the 2019 draft, nearly everyone agrees that Zion Williamson is the clear top pick, and after that there’s a small group of players considered to be part of tier 2—usually including Ja Morant and RJ Barrett. There’s less of a consensus after that, though from the mock drafts I’ve seen, the rest of the lottery should include several freshmen lacking standout college production, as well as a few older NCAA players with physical limitations and one prospect from a lower-level foreign league.

This differs substantially from last year, when the freshmen outside the top few picks were legitimately elite college players (e.g., Trae Young, Jaren Jackson Jr., Wendell Carter Jr., and Shai Gilgeous-Alexander).

Rather, this draft is much more analogous to 2015 and 2016. Each of those drafts featured a consensus #1 (KAT and Ben Simmons), followed by a 1-2 player second tier and a lot of uncertainty thereafter, resulting in a lottery featuring unproductive freshmen, upperclassmen with major limitations, and prospects from lower-level foreign leagues. A substantial majority of those players have not panned out as pros thus far.

Apart from the success of the #1 overall pick, those two drafts look very flat in retrospect. Josh Richardson, arguably the 2015 draft’s best wing, was selected with pick #40. Also in that part of the draft, #41 Pat Connaughton and #46 Norman Powell have fared better in the NBA than the first two wings off the board, Mario Hezonja (#5) and Stanley Johnson (#8). In both drafts the late-first to early-second round range appears to have had comparable talent to the early- to mid-first round, minus #1 overall. Players selected between #20 and #36 include Caris Levert, Delon Wright, Pascal Siakam, Larry Nance Jr., Kevon Looney, Montrezl Harrell, Ivica Zubac, and Malcolm Brogdon.

A couple undrafted players from 2015, Quinn Cook and Alfonzo McKinnie, cracked the Warriors’ recent Finals rotation, and the 2016 undrafted pool is even stronger: Fred VanVleet, Yogi Ferrell, Bryn Forbes, David Nwaba, Dorian Finney-Smith, and Ryan Arcidiacono.

These guys aren’t stars (with the possible exception of Siakam), but the same can be said of just about everyone outside the #1 pick in those drafts. The point is that a weak lottery generally is not indicative of a lack of useful players later in the draft. More likely, it suggests that there is value in trading down.

Since the caliber of prospect available in the mid- to late lottery is not substantially different from what you’ll find in the late first or early second round, if not later, dealing that lottery pick for a later selection and another asset is a smart move. Trading down makes even more sense when you take financial considerations into account, as mid-lottery picks make a lot more money than late first rounders. The 2019-20 NBA rookie salary scale dictates that, for example, picks 4-7 will make $5M this season on average, 3x as much as picks 24-27.

If you extend the analysis 4 years down the road to restricted free agency, the financial component weighs even more heavily in favor of trading down. The recent CBA increased cap holds across the board for free agents coming off of their rookie contracts, though in absolute terms the increases are much higher toward the top of the draft. For instance, the 2015 #4 pick, Kristaps Porzingis, takes up $17.1M of Dallas’s cap space this summer until his next contract is finalized, which can be done after the Mavericks sign other free agents. In contrast, the 2018 #4 pick, Jaren Jackson Jr., would cost $27.5M against the cap if he reaches restricted free agency in 2022. At the #24 pick, 2015 draftee Tyus Jones currently has a $7.3M cap hold, compared to an $11.8M future cap hold for 2018 draftee Anfernee Simons.

In sum, moving down in the draft can vastly improve a team’s future cap position, much more than under the previous CBA. As shown above, whereas the difference in cap holds between the #4 and #24 picks previously had been under $10M (Porzingis (17.1) minus Tyus (7.3)), that difference now exceeds $15M (JJJ (27.5) minus Simons (11.8)). In that sense, along with the direct benefits of the deal, by trading down a team can in effect gain a future first round pick as a hidden benefit, considering that the going rate to buy a mid- first rounder is approximately $15M in free agent spending power. Where the prospects are comparable, the one drafted late is substantially more valuable from a team-building perspective than the one drafted early.

Presuming that the 2019 draft is among the flatter drafts based on its likeness to 2015 and 2016, and that trading down is therefore the optimal strategy, we are left with this basic question: which prospects available later in the draft are most likely to succeed in the NBA?

Based on my review of recent drafts, I find that most of the particularly overlooked players fall into one or more of the following three categories:

  1. Broadly Productive Veteran Guards/Wings
  2. Unconventional/Unheralded Bigs
  3. Foreigners from Lesser Leagues

Broadly Productive Veteran Guards/Wings (e.g., Fred VanVleet, Monte Morris, Malcolm Brogdon, Caris LeVert, Josh Hart, Jimmy Butler, Jae Crowder, Draymond Green)

Reading the floor and quickly making good decisions with the ball is extremely difficult. Very rarely will a prospect have this ability coming out of high school, and getting repetitions at a higher level goes a long way towards preparing a perimeter player for the NBA. When a player demonstrates proficiency as a distributor, scorer, and defender at the college level, there’s a pretty strong chance he’ll succeed in the NBA. Here’s what I wrote about VanVleet a few years ago when he wasn’t selected in the draft:

Fred VanVleet was one of the most productive point guards in college basketball in each of the past 3 years. He finished his college career with 2 Missouri Valley Conference Player of the Year Awards, the 3rd most assists and 7th most steals in conference history, a 3:1 assist-to-turnover ratio, and 9 NCAA Tournament victories. Despite all those achievements, VanVleet was not selected in last month’s draft.

Why wasn’t he drafted? For the most part, it’s due to his physical limitations. Standing 6 feet tall with a 6’2” wingspan, VanVleet is small even for a point guard. He also doesn’t have particularly quick feet, either in a straight line or laterally, and he’s not much of a leaper either. He didn’t finish well around the rim in college, so it’s basically a foregone conclusion that he won’t be able to do so in the NBA.

Even granting that all of these criticisms are valid, I think he could have a solid NBA career as a backup point guard. I’d say that “pesky” is the best word to describe VanVleet as a defender, and I mean that entirely as a compliment. He crowds ball handlers and tests the boundaries of what refs will let him get away with in terms of physical contact. He doesn’t get phased by screens, as even though he’s small he’s sturdy and tough-minded, and he’s hyper-aware of what’s going on around him. If you get the chance to see him in the Summer League, watch how he communicates with his teammates and intermittently diverts his attention from his man for a split-second to keep track of where everyone is on the floor.

That awareness translates equally well to the offensive end, where VanVleet established himself as arguably the most polished and unflappable pick-and-roll ball handler in the college game. . . . Since VanVleet won’t be much of a threat to drive to the rim and score in the NBA, he’ll need to shoot well from the outside. VanVleet converted 38.6% of his 3s in college, and from what I’ve seen he’s comfortable adjusting to the NBA line.

VanVleet has certainly proven that he belongs in the NBA, as players of this type often do.

Unconventional/Unheralded Bigs (e.g., Draymond Green, Pascal Siakam, Larry Nance Jr., Kyle Kuzma, Dwight Powell, Nikola Jokic)

Notice that Draymond would qualify in each of the first two categories, and this is the more obvious one for him as the prototype small-ball center. In the NBA draft, teams still gravitate toward big men who are at least 7’ tall, score in the post, protect the rim, and come from a marquee NCAA program. Guys whose offensive skills skew more towards passing, ballhandling, screening, and/or spacing the floor can get overlooked, particularly if they’re viewed as undersized, play for a school outside the media spotlight, or excel defensively based on their awareness and activity rather than a massive standing reach or vertical leap.

Foreigners from Lesser Leagues: (e.g., Nikola Jokic, Giannis Antetokounmpo, Rudy Gobert, Clint Capela, Ivica Zubac, Rodions Kurucs)

Players like Doncic who star in Euroleague and the Spanish ACB are well-known commodities entering the draft. Those who play in less-established, lower-level leagues are more difficult to evaluate for a number of reasons. Their statistics are less meaningful, fewer scouts attend their games, and there’s less (and lower-quality) video of their performances available as well. As a result, I believe that these are particularly high-variance prospects. We’ve seen a lot of these players get drafted late and excel—see the list above—but we’ve also seen a few selected with a top pick and fall well short of expectations (Mario Hezonja, Dragan Bender).

Looking more closely at the 2019 draft, I find that there are a bunch of players fitting these 3 categories who are expected to be drafted late. And as expected, beyond the consensus top 3, I’m failing to see much separation between the first 20 picks and the next 20. Here are picks #4-23 and then #24-43 in ESPN’s current mock draft, side by side:

Pick Player Pick Player
4 Darius Garland 24 Matisse Thybulle
5 De’Andre Hunter 25 KZ Okpala
6 Jarrett Culver 26 Ty Jerome
7 Coby White 27 Luguentz Dort
8 Cam Reddish 28 Eric Paschall
9 Sekou Doumbouya 29 Darius Bazley
10 Jaxson Hayes 30 Luka Samanic
11 Nassir Little 31 Nic Claxton
12 Rui Hachimura 32 Grant Williams
13 PJ Washington 33 Talen Horton-Tucker
14 Brandon Clarke 34 Carsen Edwards
15 Romeo Langford 35 Dylan Windler
16 Tyler Herro 36 Admiral Schofield
17 Mfiondu Kabengele 37 Bruno Fernando
18 Nickeil Alexander-Walker 38 Isaiah Roby
19 Goga Bitadze 39 Terence Davis
20 Bol Bol 40 Daniel Gafford
21 Cameron Johnson 41 Chuma Okeke
22 Kevin Porter Jr. 42 Jontay Porter
23 Keldon Johnson 43 DaQuan Jeffries

The first column is full of NCAA freshmen, most of whom were maddeningly inconsistent or absent this past season, including Garland, Reddish, Little, Langford, Bol, Porter, and Keldon Johnson.

Yet the draft pool contains an impressive number of exceedingly productive veteran guards and wings. Players of this type in the second column include Matisse Thybulle, Ty Jerome, Grant Williams, Carsen Edwards, Dylan Windler, Terence Davis, and DaQuan Jeffries. Several others in this category are projected as late second rounders or undrafted free agents: Cody Martin, Jeremiah Martin, CJ Massinburg, and Shamorie Ponds to name a few.

There are also a few unconventional bigs in that 24-43 range: Eric Paschall, Nic Claxton, Grant Williams, Isaiah Roby, and Jontay Porter. In my view, Grant Williams fits both categories as a hybrid 3/4/5 and one of the NCAA’s most productive players. Williams, Paschall, and Roby have Small Forward height but play bigger based on strength and physicality. Claxton and Porter have Center size in terms of height and standing reach, but they play a more perimeter-oriented style of offense, heavy on facilitating and jumpshooting.

Luka Samanic (#30 above) probably falls into that unconventional big category as well, though I’m not familiar enough with him to say for sure. He’s definitely an underscouted foreigner from a lesser league though, and therefore the type of prospect I’d be wary of selecting with a top pick but excited to draft at the end of the first round or as a second rounder.

I’ll unveil my all-underrated prospect team later this week. As a precursor, I’ll note that each of the 5 players I’ve selected appears in the second column above.

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